The North Korean Crisis, The Issues, and a Post-war Korea

The recent provocative action by the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea, or North (N) Korea, has been the subject of much international concern. The latest nuclear test, along with the radical and reckless rhetoric on the part of the N Korean government (if i can call that a government) has resulted in the UN Security Council passing Resolution 1874, slapping tougher sanctions on the reclusive Stalinist regime.

Here, I’ll talk about how the crisis escalated to the seriousness we witness now, the issues behind the crisis, the possibility and implications of a second Korean War, if war actually breaks out.

The predicament faced by the international community where the N Korean nuclear programme in concerned, is the result of two main factors. First, the inconsistency and lack of flexibility of the US policy, and the constraints and considerations of all the five parties (the six parties excluding N Korea) in the handling of the crisis.

First, the inconsistency and inflexibility of policy. The N Korean nuclear crisis began during the Clinton administration. Then the US still had some flexibility to handle the situation, as it had several policy options. It chose to adopt a policy of giving incentives in exchange for the abandonment of the nuclear programme. The most crucial features in the agreement included the export of petroleum and two light water reactors (the kind used for generating electricity, not for weapons-grade uranium). It was called the Agreed Framework, and it created potential for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear problem.

However, the Bush administration was against the Agreed Framework, and tried all means to kill the idea. Ultimately, the Agreed Framework was abandoned before its full implementation, particularly the delivery of the light reactors.

In addition, the Bush administration had strong predispositions about N Korea. It refused to engage in bilateral negotiations, adopted a very tough and inflexible approach, and refused anything less than the “complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantling” of N Korea’s nuclear facilities.

The result?

All of the policy options available to the US were closed off. Given N Korea’s provocative style, this meant that the US would not have any other option against N Korea if it succeeds in completing its nuclear programme.

Which was exactly what happened.

The situation we see now is that N Korea has completed the process of building and testing a weapons device. The nuclearisation of N Korea is a foregone conclusion, and the US has therefore failed in preventing N Korea from having nuclear weaponry.

Resolution 1874, while being a strong signal by the international community in its condemnation of N Korea’s actions, is also a manifestation of the frustration by the international community, particularly the US, S Korea and Japan at their lack of options against N Korea.

So, what about the other parties?

China has its own considerations. Actually, China is very dissatisfied with N Korea’s actions, firstly because it seriously threatens the peace in the region, and secondly, it marked the defiance of N Korea towards China, a country it recognizes as its “big brother”. But, the last thing China wants is the collapse of the N Korean regime. It will mean the massive exodus of N Korean refugees into China, a humanitarian crisis China is not willing and able to handle, and also the extension of S Korean and US influence in the Korean peninsula. So despite its anger, it has no wish to upset the status quo, and has therefore taken a restrained (read weak), conciliatory approach to the crisis.

Japan? That’s quite obvious. Japan is bound by its pacifist constitution, in which it permanently renounces the use of force as a solution to diplomatic issues. In addition, it takes on a secondary role as compared to that of the US.

Russia. Russia’s real interest in not in the Far East. It’s in Eastern Europe. The reason why Russia’s in the six party talks in the first place is because of its proximity and that the US wanted to leverage on Russia to exert pressure on N Korea in a multilateral approach to the crisis.

S Korea, like Japan, it does not play the leading role. Like the US, a change of government in S Korea also meant the change in stance. The approach by President Lee is a departure from the “Sunshine Policy” of President Kim and the conciliatory policy of President Roh. In addition, if a war does break out, S Korea will be first to face the full brunt of the conflict.

These considerations combine to create an overall approach that is inconsistent at best, weak at worst.

I will not go on detail the consequences of a nuclear N Korea, since it has been much explored. I’ll just do a quick list:

The Nuclearisation of Northeast Asia

The sale of nuclear technology by N Korea to threatening countries or groups

The increase in military buildup and deployment in the Korean peninsula

The change in Japan’s military posture to a more aggressive one

Among others.

Instead, let’s talk about something which might not happen but will interest most people.

Actually, the Korean War never ended. What was signed in 1953 was an armistice, a ceasefire. So technically, the two Koreas, and the US are still in a state of war. So to call a war, if it breaks out, the “Second Korean War” will be a misnomer.

N Korea can continue with its rhetoric, but can never launch a war. That’s because it knows it cannot win. But it also knows that the other parties will not be willing to fight that war, for the reasons I mentioned above. So it continues its reckless rhetoric, stirring up international sentiment, and amplifying the magnitude of the crisis.

But what if war does break out? What if N Korea lives up to its word? What if the US, S Korea and Japan orchestrate a pre-emptive strike at Yongbyon? What if China runs out of patience?

The “Second Korean War”, if I can call it that, will be the most destructive war of the early 21st century, and will also be the greatest humanitarian crisis of the early 21st century. It might not be exaggerating to call it WW3 instead.

What about after the war? What happens next? Questions abound, but here’s what I think:

The international community needs to act together to address probably the worst humanitarian crisis in our time. Millions of refugees, having starved for many years, trapped in a war zone more volatile than that of Sri Lanka, will start flooding towards Northeast China. Millions will die due to starvation and exposure. More will die in the cross-fire.

The creation of a new political system in N Korea. The N Korean people, having lived under that regime for so long, knows no other. Decades will have to be spent creating a new political, economic and social structure that is workable, or N Korea will fall back into a failed state. The effect of decades of propaganda and brainwashing will also be difficult to address. It’ll be foolish to suggest instituting democracy in post-war N Korea. Decades will have to be spent instead on creating strong and good government almost on the N Korean model itself. Decades will also have to be spent on a reverse-propaganda campaign to discredit the N Korean regime.

The problem of die-hards. What about those die-hards steadfastly loyal to the Kims and their regime? What if the Allies fail to capture Kim, his successor, and to destroy his leadership? Decades will again have to be spent fighting these remnants in a terrorist problem more serious than that faced by Pakistan and Afghanistan against the Taliban.

This is how I look at the N Korean crisis. However it develops, it doesn’t spell well for peace in the region, and the world.