When Hardware isn’t Everything

Today I’ll do a military post. I was inspired by the recent vote cast by the US Senate against the acquisition of an additional seven F-22 raptor fighter jets as part of a defence authorisation bill.

This was in support of President Obama’s desire to reduce wastage in defence spending, and focusing on fighting insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan rather than military hardware.

In his words:

“At a time when we’re fighting two wars and facing a serious deficit, this would have been an inexcusable waste of money”

“I reject the notion that we have to waste billions of taxpayer dollars on outdated and unnecessary defence projects…”

Just for your knowledge, the F-22 raptor looks like this:



And the US Air Force (USAF) already has 187 of these, the most advanced jet fighter in the world.

Personally, I commend President Obama and the US Senate for their decision. But there are three main issues I’ll like to explore as a response to this issue, and from there, talk about the whole notion of defence spending in general.

First, the effectiveness of the F-22.
Second, the military-industrial complex.
Third, the emphasis on hardware.


The F-22 was designed as an air-superiority fighter, meaning it was designed to take out enemy fighters. For that purpose, it was designed to have stealth features, the ability to “supercruise” (travel at supersonic speed without afterburner), and thrust vectoring for extra manoeuvrability.

But the problem is, given the current nature of military operations in the world today, is such a category of military hardware still relevant? In the post-cold war world, terrorism has superseded conventional militaries as the primary threat to national security. Given this context, wouldn’t it be wiser to spend on counter-insurgency?

Besides, the complexities of such military hardware create huge costs for governments, due to maintenance costs, and the need for specialised support equipment and services. The specialist role of the F-22 also implies other planes have to be bought to fulfil other roles, such as the ground attack role.

This is why some people argue that the alternative, the multi-role F-35 Lightning II, better known as the Joint Strike Fighter, is a better choice:



The second issue is that of the military-industrial complex. Supporters of the acquisition argue that F-22 production provides 25,000 jobs, and indirectly support 70,000 jobs. The defence industry forms an integral part of the US economy, in what is called the military-industrial complex, coined by former US President Dwight Eisenhower.

In a nutshell, it defines the politico-economic relationship between the state, the military and the defence industries.

To illustrate how it works:

A militaristic government wants to use military action to fulfill some strategic or political objective, and sends the military for these operations. Since the military needs hardware and support services to carry out these wars, it has to purchase them from the defence industries, which therefore are supported by and profits from the state. In return, the defence industries sponsor the government, bringing its politicians back into power. The government is then free to continue its militaristic policies, continuing the cycle.

So what is the problem here?

First, the government is trapped in the vicious cycle of militarism. Governments become dependent on the support of the defence industries for their legitimacy, and the defence industries push them towards aggressive foreign policies. Therefore, governments can become corrupted by this relationship, since defence industries hold so much leverage.

Second, it affects other sectors of the economy. The primacy of the defence industry means that other industries are not given the same level of attention and development.

The increasing weakness of US manufacturing industry, with the exception of the defence industry is evidence of the advent of the military-industrial complex.


Third, why all that emphasis on hardware?

As I have mentioned above, the current nature of military action has changed since the times of the Cold War. Of course, there are emerging powers such as China, and re-emerging powers such as Russia, that are still aggressively pursuing policies of modernisation within their militaries.

But there are two things to consider. First, the advent of diplomacy within the international community. The international community has been united by the common threats of international terrorism and rogue states. Their relative military strengths have been channelled towards the containment of these two threats.

Second, given the weak global economy, isn’t it wiser to spend money on more constructive purposes, rather than “destructive” ones?

Actually, come to think of it, the same thing is happening to Singapore too. Over recent years, the Singapore Armed Forces have acquired a whole array of military hardware as part of its project of modernisation. F-15 fighters, Formidable - class stealth frigates, Leopard 2 main battle tanks...
But it begs the question: does it fulfil the true needs of our military? It does, if one considers the age of the equipment these new hardware were designated to replace, but on the other hand, how is “improvement” on our defence capability measured?

It’s certainly not a game of numbers, nor is it a matter of “who’s got the latest hardware”.

And what about the average soldier? Has his life as a soldier improved?

To end off this post on a lighter note, I think the F-22 issue could come to a better conclusion if only they got their hands on this particular F-22:



Yeah. Starscream.

The only question left would be: Will we control him, or will we end up controlled by him?